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11 Introduction
There are occasional examples of successful battles against the corruption per-
petrated by criminal organizations to inﬂuence law enforcement and politics.
For example, in 1931, right after prohibition of alcohol consumption ended in
the United States, the conviction of the notorious gang leader Al Capone for
tax evasion led to the break up of mobs and rackets built around the distrib-
ution of alcohol, and other complementary activities. Yet, failed attempts to
curb the inﬂuence of organized crime are common place. Recently, in Italy,
the investigation mani pulite (clean hands) initiated by a courageous group
of judges disintegrated after disclosing pervasive corruption by the Maﬁa, due
to a string of assassinations inﬂicted upon law enforcers and their families.
In general, organized crime syndicates are very diﬃcult to eliminate. They
are able to protect themselves by a combination of means: (i) Physical vio-
lence against informants and witnesses, (ii) violent threats against prosecutors,
judges and members of juries, (iii) corruption of law-enforcement oﬃcials, (iv)
Use of lawyers to manipulate the legal system, and (v) ﬁnancial contributions
to political campaigns.
The objective of this paper is to better understand the complex relationship
between organized crime, corruption and the eﬃciency of the justice system.
We will in fact focus on the evasion from conviction by criminal organizations
through bribing law enforcers. However, the relevance of our ﬁndings is not
conﬁned to the inﬂuence on the operation of the legal system exerted through
this channel. As long as organized crime can invest to manipulate the incen-
tives faced by the actors involved in making prosecution possible, our results
obtain regarding the limited eﬀectiveness of typical crime deterrents in weak
governance environments.
Criminal gangs are active and clever in their eﬀorts to bribe policemen.
Cooperative police oﬃcers are helpful to criminal gangs by passing informa-
tion to them about police investigations and planned raids, and by making
deliberate ‘mistakes’ in prosecutions. Such technical errors then ensure that
the charges against the criminals will not result in guilty verdicts. Corruption
of police oﬃcers is made easier by the fact that they are modestly paid and,
therefore, are subject to temptation. Moreover, like prosecutors and members
of juries, law enforcers can be coerced through violence. Also, once a few po-
2licemen have been corrupted, they will make strong eﬀorts to ensure that their
colleagues are also corrupted. An honest policeman who tries to inform on his
corrupt colleagues will come under the most severe pressures from them.
The literature on crime has emphasized the deterrence capacity of the jus-
tice system on criminal activities (e.g. Becker 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, Levitt,
1998). Recent evidence for the United States tends to support the hypothesis
that the expectations of potential criminals with respect to punishment deter-
mine crime rates (see e.g. Levitt, 1997). Yet, expected punishment depends
not only on the severity of sentences but also on the probability of convic-
tion once crime is perpetrated. The latter depends on detection by the police,
prosecution by attorneys and the deliberation of judges and juries. As long as
these three activities are conducted transparently and eﬃciently, tough sanc-
tions will deliver deterrence of criminal activity.1 However if, as described
above, corruption is pervasive, then the eﬃciency in law enforcement can be
very much reduced.
Since Becker and Stigler (1974) acknowledge that malfeasance by enforcers
can diminish the eﬀectiveness of laws and sanctions in controlling crime, the lit-
erature on crime has considered the problem of bribed oﬃcials.2 They propose
the payment of eﬃciency wages to prevent bribe taking. Besley and McLaren
(1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) also propose wage regimes to mitigate
the moral hazard problem when rent seekers attempt to co-opt law enforcers.
Like Becker and Stigler (1974), Bowles and Garoupa (1997) consider a model
in which bribery reduces punishment and thus deterrence. However, the focus
is diﬀerent since it is on the eﬀects of bribery on the optimal allocation of
resources (which incorporates the social costs of both crime and corruption)
within the public enforcement agency. They show that the maximal ﬁne may
not be optimal. Chang et al. (2000) extend Bowles and Garoupa (1997) by
introducing psychological costs (or social norms) of caught corrupt oﬃcers.
They show that, when corruption is widespread, social norms can no longer
take a suﬃcient sanction against a corrupt oﬃcer, and raising ﬁnes can in fact
1It is also well-known that, when expected punishment is itself endogenous and negatively
depends on the number of criminals, multiple equilibria in crime and deterrence may emerge
(see for instance Fender, 1999, or Sah, 1991).
2For a comprehensive survey on law enforcement, see Polinski and Shavell (2000). Also,
for a general survey on corruption and governance, see Bardhan (1997).
3result in more crime. Another extension of Bowles and Garoupa (1997) is done
by Garoupa and Jellal (2002). They consider the role of asymmetric informa-
tion on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. They show
that asymmetric information about the private costs of enforcers engaging in
collusion might eventually deter corruption and bargaining between the two
parties. Finally, Basu et al. (1992) argue that when the possibility of collusion
between law enforcing agents and criminals is introduced, control of corruption
becomes more diﬃcult than is suggested by the standard Beckerian approach.
Marjit and Shi (1998) extend this paper and show that controlling crime be-
comes diﬃcult, if not impossible, because the probability of detection can be
aﬀected by the eﬀort of a corrupt oﬃcial. Finally, in a recent paper Polinski
and Shavell (2001) consider the dilution of deterrence caused by corruption not
only due to bribing by criminals but also extortion of the innocent by crooked
enforcers. They propose rewards for corruption reports to mitigate the break-
down of deterrence. Our approach diﬀers from the literature in that we focus
is on the relationship between organized crime,3 corruption and punishment in
the context of imperfect competition. Hence, we ﬁnd not only a reduction in
deterrence eﬀectiveness due to corruption as in previous models but actually
a potential reversal whereby policies usually associated with crime deterrence
can become inducements as long as bribery remains unchecked.
In the present paper, we analyze the role of corruption not only in diluting
deterrence but also as a strategic complement to crime and therefore a catalyst
to organized crime. For that, we develop a simple oligopoly model in which n
criminal organizations compete with each other on the levels of both criminal
activities and corruption. We ﬁrst show that when the cost of bribing judges or
the number of criminal organizations increases, then both crime and corruption
decrease whereas when the proﬁtability of crime increases, then both crime and
corruption increase. We then show our main results. If corruption is costly,
due to law enforcers being well-paid, hard to bribe and easily detected when
accepting side payments, relative to the proﬁts from crime, then, as predicted
by the standard literature on crime, it is always eﬀective to reduce crime by
intensifying policing or toughening sanctions. However, in the reverse case
of low-paid dishonest law enforcers under weak governance and sizable rents
3There is a small theoretical literature on organized crime (without corruption). See in
particular Fiorentini and Peltzman (1996), Garoupta (2000) and Mansour et al. (2000).
4from illegal activity relative to the outside lawful options, increasing policing
or sanctions may in some cases generate higher crime rates.
This last result is fairly intuitive. As long as the return to legal economic
activity is suﬃciently low relative to rents from crime, gangs continue pursing
crime. When sanctions and policing are toughened, the cost of hiring criminals
rises as there is a wage premium to compensate for the risk of conviction if
apprehended. This will discourage crime but only up to a point. In particular,
if bribing costs are small relative to the rents from crime, there is level of ex-
pected punishment beyond which further toughening of sanctions will induce
increasingly higher levels of corruption, and of ensuing crime. Indeed, when
governance is weak, harsher punishment can be a catalyst for organized crime
and may lead to concentration of criminal rents and higher rates of return
ex post. For example, in the 1920’s during alcohol prohibition in the United
States, mob activities were so proﬁt a b l et h a to r g a n i z e dc r i m ec o u l da ﬀord to
keep in its payroll government oﬃcials at various levels, including elected politi-
cians and law enforcers, to inﬂuence the legal system in its favor. Therefore,
the potential eﬀectiveness of tough sentencing as an eﬀective policy to stop
organized crime and other subsidiary illegal activities is limited. This does
not imply that tough sanctioning of crime and policing should be abandoned
altogether when institutional checks and balances are underdeveloped. But,
rather that unless corruption is curbed, traditional deterrence policies can have
the perverse eﬀect of making crime and corruption strategic complements.
We then show that our results are robust when criminal organizations can
freely enter the crime market. Indeed, when the ﬁxed cost of entry is bounded
both below and above, we show that increasing sanctions can in fact increase
the local and global levels of corruption and crime.
After this introduction, Section 2 sets up the model by describing the prob-
lem of the criminal organization. Section 3 characterizes the corruption mar-
ket. In Section 4, the interaction between crime and corruption is analyzed and
the main propositions are presented. Section 5 analyzes the free-entry equilib-
rium. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing some implications
of the results obtained.
52T h e m o d e l
There are n criminal organizations in the economy. These organizations com-
pete with each other on crime but are local monopsonies in the corruption
market. On the crime market (think for example of drug cartels), there is
a pie to be shared and Cournot competition takes place. On the corruption
market, there is a continuum of judges to bribe for each of the n criminal orga-
nizations. As this will become clear below, crime is global whereas corruption
is local.
Let us ﬁrst describe the proﬁt function. For each criminal organization,
the revenue from criminal activities depends on the number of crimes and the
size of the booty per crime. The cost is given by the wage bill accruing the
criminals and the bribes paid to avoid conviction when crimes are detected.
For the criminal organization i =1 ,...,n,p r o ﬁts are given by:






is the total number of crimes perpetrated in the economy, Ci denotes the
number of crimes committed by organization i, B (C) is the booty per crime
for all criminal organizations, with B0(C) < 0 (the booty per crime B(C) is
assumed to decrease as the number of crimes increases), wi is the wage paid by
each criminal organization i, determined below, to their Li employed criminals,
and Ti are the total costs to bribe judges borne by the criminal organization
i. To be explicitly determined below. For simplicity, we assume about crime
proﬁtability and technology that B(C)=B − C and Ci = Li.
L e tu sd e t e r m i n et h ew a g ewi. Each worker/criminal is risk neutral. The
participation constraint for a given criminal working in organization i is given
by:
φ[wi − (αi.0+( 1− αi)S)] + (1 − φ)wi ≥ w0 (2)
where 0 < φ < 1 is the probability of detection of a crime, αi denotes the
probability that a judge is corrupted by organization i, S>0 is the sanction
when punishment of detected crime is enforced and w0 > 0 is the outside wage
if the individual has a regular job and is not a criminal. Take equation (2).
6The left hand side gives the expected gain of a criminal. Indeed, if he/she is
not caught (with probability 1 − φ), he/she gets wi. If he/she is caught (with
probability φ), he/she still obtains wi (we assume that criminals get their
wage even when they are caught); if the judge is corrupted by organization
i (with probability αi), the criminal has no sanction whereas if the judge is
not corrupted by organization i (with probability 1 − αi), the criminal has a
sanction S (for example number of years in prison). This is key incentive for
a criminal to work for an organization since, apart from wi, he/she beneﬁts
from protection (especially corrupted judges).
In equilibrium, this constraint is bidding since there is no incentive for the
criminal group to pay more than the outside wage. Therefore, the reservation
wage for which workers accept to commit crime for organization i is equal to:
wi = φS(1 − αi)+w0 (3)
Interestingly, in equilibrium, this wage will be determined by the level of
corruption αi in each organization since the higher the level of corruption, the
lower this wage. Indeed, if the risk to be prosecuted for a criminal is low, then,
as long as wi is greater w0 (which is always the case; see (3)), there is no need
to pay a high wage.
3 Corruption
The interaction between criminal organizations and judges is modeled here
by means of a monopsonistic competitive market inspired by Salop (1979).
For that, we consider n local markets (for example regions or local areas);
each of them is described by the circumference of a circle which has length 1.
In each local market, there is one criminal organization and a continuum of
judges uniformly distributed on the circumference of the circle; the density is
constant and equal to 1. Without loss of generality, organization i’s (=1 ,...n)
location is normalized to 0. The space in which each criminal organization
and judges are located is interpreted as the “transaction cost” space. As a
result, criminal organizations compete with each other on crime, i.e. crime is
global, whereas they only corrupt judges locally, i.e. corruption is local.T h i s
means that, if a criminal belonging to organization i is caught, he/she will be
prosecuted by a judge located in market i. In other words, criminals commit
7crime everywhere but are only prosecuted in the region where they are coming
from. For example, for the drug business, it implies that criminal organizations
via their “employees” sell drug everywhere but their criminals are prosecuted
where they live.
Contrary to the standard spatial model (Salop, 1979), the horizontal dif-
ferentiation of judges is from the point of view of criminal organizations. In
other words, the latter are paying all the transaction costs needed to bribe a
judge. From the judge’s point of view, there is no diﬀerentiation since they will
accept a bribe if and only if their expected gain is greater than their current
wage. As a result, the “distance” of a judge to a criminal organization reﬂects
the transaction cost necessary to agree on a bribe. If we take for example the
case of Italy, it is clear that it is easier for a criminal organization located in
Sicily to bribe a judge located in Palermo than in Milan because it has more
contacts with local people and also speak the same dialect.
Judges’ location types are denoted by x. The higher the distance, the
higher is the (transaction) cost to bribe a judge. The transaction cost function
between a criminal organization located in 0 and a judge x is t|x|,w h e r et
expresses the transaction cost per unit of distance in the location space. We
assume that the outside option of a judge is wb, i.e. the latter is the current
wage of the judge.
In this paper, we focus on non-covered (corruption) markets, i.e. markets
i nw h i c hs o m eo ft h ej u d g e sd on o ta c c e p tb r i b e sa n da r et h u sn o tc o r r u p t e d .
W eb e l i e v ei ti sm u c hm o r er e a l i s t i ct h a nac o v e r e dm a r k e ti nw h i c ha l lj u d g e s
will be corrupted in equilibrium. This means that each criminal organization
acts as a (local) monopsony on the corruption market whereas they will com-
pete a la Cournot on the crime market. Denote by xi the boundary of the
area of each monopsonist i, which implies that each criminal organization will
bribe 2xi judges in equilibrium. Since each criminal organization is alone in
the corruption market, we have to check that xi < 1/2, ∀i =1 ,...,n,s ot h a t ,
in equilibrium, the corruption market is not covered. Observe that, even if the
prosecution and thus the corruption are local, the probability to be prosecuted
by a corrupted judge is never 1. Indeed, when a criminal belonging to orga-
nization i is caught, one knows that he/she will be judged in region i but one
does not know the judge to which the case has been assigned. This is why the
probability to be prosecuted by a corrupted judge in region i is 2xi,w h i c hi s
8obviously strictly less than 1.
All judges are risk neutral. The participation constraint for a judge who is
bribed by a criminal organization i located at a distance xi is thus given by
(1 − q)(f + wb) ≥ wb
where q is the probability that corruption is caught (quite naturally, we assume
that if a judge is caught, he/she loses his/her wage wb)a n df is the bribe given
to the judge. Observe that f is not indexed by i since on the corruption market
each criminal organization has total monopsony power and thus ﬁxed a bribe
that just binds the judge’s participation constraint; the latter only depends
on q and wb. Once again, the left hand side gives the expected beneﬁtf r o m
corruption whereas the right hand side describes the gain from no-corruption.
The sanction for corruption is the loss of the job and the bribe is lost as
criminals receive no protection. As a result, for each organization i =1 ,...,n





As stated above, all judges are identical so that at f they will always
accept a bribe (we could have assumed that the bribe is f +ε,w h e r eε is very
small but positive; this would obviously not change our results so whenever
judges are indiﬀerent they accept to be bribed). However, from the criminal
organization’s point of view each judge is not located at the same “distance”
so that the transaction cost to bribe a judge is diﬀerent from one judge to
another. Since xi is the maximum “distance” acceptable for each criminal
organization i (i.e. beyond xi the transaction cost of bribing a judge is too





(f + t)xdx =( f + t)x
2
i
4If we take a geographical interpretation, then the total cost (f + t)x of bribing a judge
located at a distance x from a criminal organization is as follows. The criminal organization
h a st o“ t r a v e l ”ad i s t a n c ex,a tac o s tt per unit of distance, to see the judge and then has to
bribe him/her, at a cost f per unit of distance, i.e. the cost of bribing a judge depends on the
physical distance between this judge and the criminal organization . In fact, we assume that
there is a perfect correlation between the physical distance and the bribe distance between
a criminal organization and a judge, even though the cost per unit of distance is diﬀerent,
i.e. t 6= f.
9In this context, since the length of the circumference of the circle is normalized
to 1, the probability αi (the fraction of law enforcers that will be bribed in
equilibrium by paying to each of them a bribe f)i sg i v e nb yαi =2 xi/1=2 xi.
Taking into account all the elements (in particular the participation con-
straint of the criminal (3) and the participation constraint of each judge), and








Ci − [φS (1 − 2xi)+w0]Ci − (f + t)x
2
i (5)
This proﬁt function of each criminal organization is divided in three parts.
The ﬁrst one is the proceeds from crime, which depends on the competition
in the crime market between the diﬀerent crime organizations. The second
corresponds to the salary costs of hiring criminals while the third part denotes
the costs of bribing judges.
4 Crime and corruption
As stated above, criminal organizations compete on both crime and corrup-
tion. On the crime market, each criminal organization i competes a la Cournot
by determining the optimal Ci. On the corruption market, each acts as local
monopsonist by determining the optimal xi (indeed, they have to determine
the maximum distance xi beyond which it is not proﬁtable corrupting a judge).
Because, in this model, judges are basically permanent employees of criminal
organizations, the choices of Ci and xi are simultaneous. Thus, choosing simul-
taneously Ciand xi (observe that there is a one-to-one relationship between xi




Cj − Ci − [φS (1 − 2xi)+w0]=0 (6)
2φSCi − 2(f + t)xi =0 (7)
Using the Hessian matrix, it is easy to verify that the proﬁt function (5) is
strictly concave (implying a unique maximum) if and only if:
f + t>2(φS)
2 (8)
10Let us now focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which Ci = Cj = C∗ and
xi = xj = x∗. These two ﬁrst order conditions are now given by:
B − (n +1 ) C
∗ = φS (1 − 2x
∗)+w0 (9)
φSC
∗ =( f + t)x
∗ (10)
Now, from (9) we obtain
C
∗ =
B − w0 − φS (1 − 2x∗)
n +1
(11)
Plugging (11) into (10) yields
x
∗ =
φS (B − w0 − φS)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 (12)
Then, by plugging (12) into (11), we have
C
∗ =
(f + t)(B − w0 − φS)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 (13)




(f + t)/2,B− w0,




Then, there is a unique equilibrium C∗ and α∗ =2 x∗,w h e r et h en u m b e r
of crime per criminal organization C∗ i sg i v e nb y( 1 3 )a n dt h en u m b e ro f
corrupted judges per criminal organization α∗ =2 x∗ by (12). Both of them
are strictly positive and (1 − α∗)n judges are not corrupted in equilibrium.
Moreover, the equilibrium proﬁt of each criminal organization is given by
π
∗(n)=
(f + t)(B − w0 − φS)
2 (f + t − (φS)
2)
[(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2]
2 > 0 (15)
and the wage paid to each criminal is equal to
w
∗(n)=φS
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2φS (B − w0)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 + w0 >w 0 (16)
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The following comments are in order. First, condition (14) guarantees that
both C∗ and x∗ are strictly positive and that the solution of the maximization
11problem is unique. Condition (14) also ensures that, in equilibrium, some
judges are not corrupted (i.e. x∗ < 1/2). Indeed, the diﬀerence between the
booty B and the wage of an individual having a regular job (i.e. working in the
“legal” sector) has to be large enough to induce criminal organizations to hire
criminals and to bribe judges but at the same time its has to be bounded above
otherwise all judges will be corrupted because the proﬁt of each organization
would be too large. Second, when choosing C∗ the optimal number of criminals
to hire, each criminal organization faces two opposite eﬀects. When it increases
C, the proceeds from crime is higher (positive loot eﬀect) but the competition
will be ﬁercer (negative competition eﬀect) and the salary costs higher (negative
salary eﬀect). As a result, choosing the optimal C∗ results of a trade-oﬀ
between the ﬁrst positive eﬀect and the second and third negative eﬀects. This
trade-oﬀ is reﬂected in the ﬁrst order condition (9). Finally, when choosing x∗
the level of corruption, each criminal organization only faces two eﬀects (there
is no competition since each criminal organization acts as a monopsonist in
the corruption market). Indeed, when it increases x, each criminal’s salary
becomes less costly (positive salary eﬀect) since criminals have less chance to
be sentenced but the costs of bribing judges increase (negative bribe eﬀect).
This trade-oﬀ is reﬂe c t e di nt h eﬁrst order condition (10).
At this stage, it is important to question the timing of the model in which
the choices of Ci and xi are simultaneous, implying that some judges are
basically permanent employees of criminal organizations. Another possibility
would have been that criminal organizations commit crimes ﬁrst, and then,
when detected, invest resources to bribe the judge to which the case has been
assigned. In that case, the timing would have been that Ci is chosen ﬁrst
and then xi is decided. It is easy to verify that using this timing, we would
have obtained exactly the same results than using the simultaneous choice
timing, i.e. C∗ and x∗ will still be given by (13) and (12). This is because
in both cases crime has not strategical eﬀects on corruption, i.e. C−i (crimes
committed by all other criminals but i)h a sn oe ﬀect on xi (see equation (7)).
However, if the timing was to choose ﬁrst xi and then Ci,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f y
that Ci w o u l dd e p e n db o t ho nxi and x−i,a n d ,i nt h i sc a s e ,t h er e s u l t sw o u l d
drastically change. But, with this timing, the economic interpretation does
not make very much sense since it implies that criminal organizations decide
on corruption before even committing crime.
12It is now interesting to analyze the properties of the equilibrium. We have
a ﬁrst simple result.
Proposition 2 Assume (14). Then,
(i) When f the cost of bribing judges, t the unit transaction cost of bribing
judges or n the number of criminal organizations increases, then both crime
and corruption decrease.
(ii) When the net proceeds of crime B −w0 increases, then both crime and
corruption increase.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Not surprisingly, increasing the costs of bribing judges (f and t) or giving
higher wages to judges leads to less crime and to less corruption. Moreover,
raising the number of criminal organizations n also decreases crime and cor-
ruption because competition in the crime market becomes ﬁercer and it feeds
back to the corruption market. Lastly, when the proceeds from crime increase
then obviously crime and corruption increase.
Let us go further in the analysis. The following proposition gives our main
results.5
Proposition 3 Assume (14). Then,
(i) If (B−w0)2 ≤ 2(f +t)(n+1) 2/(n+2) 2, for small values of φS,i n c r e a s -
ing sanctions increases corruption. But for values of φS larger than a
threshold, increasing sanctions decreases corruption. However, increas-
ing sanctions always reduces crime.
(ii) If 2(f +t)(n+1 ) 2/(n+2 ) 2 < (B −w0)2 ≤ (f +t)(n +2 ) 2/8,i n c r e a s i n g
sanctions reduces crime and increases corruption.
(iii) If (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8, increasing sanctions always increases
corruption. However, for small values of φS, increasing sanctions re-
duces crime. But values of φS larger than a threshold, increasing sanc-
tions increases crime. This implies that above this threshold value of φS,
increasing sanctions increase both crime and corruption.
5The technical counterpart of Proposition 3 is Proposition 7, which is given in Appendix
1.
13Proof. See Appendix 1.
Using Figures 1a, 1b and 1c that illustrate Proposition 3 we can give the
intuition of the main results. When (B − w0)2 ≤ 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2,
the labor productivity w0 is high, the proceeds from crime B is quite low,
the probability to be caught for a corrupted judge q and his/her wage wb
are quite high (see (4)) and the transaction costs t to corrupt a judge are
quite large. If we think of two contrasting regions of the same country, say
Italy, then this case could represent the “North”. If we think instead of two
contrasting countries, say the United States and Colombia, then this would
obviously correspond to the United States. Using Figure 1a, it is easy to see
that, in this case, increasing φ the probability to be caught as a criminal (e.g.
frequency of crime detection by policemen in the region) and S the sanctions
(e.g. loss due to imprisonment prison) always reduce crime.
However, corruption can in fact increase for low values of φS and decrease
for high values of φS. The intuition runs as follows. When B − w0 is quite
low compared to f and t, the productivity of workers is high (implying high
wages to induce them to become criminal) and the proceeds from crime is low
compared to the high costs of bribing judges. Moreover, it is easy to see that
the negative competition eﬀect and the positive loot eﬀect are not aﬀected by a
variation of φS whereas the negative salary eﬀect is aﬀected since it becomes
even more costly to hire criminal (they have a higher chance to be caught). So,
when φS increase, each criminal organization ﬁn d si to p t i m a lt or e d u c ec r i m e
(or more exactly the number of criminals hired) because the costs of hiring
criminals become too large compared to the beneﬁts of crime. However, this is
not true on the corruption market. Indeed, when φS varies, the positive salary
eﬀect is aﬀected since it becomes more costly to hire a criminal whereas the
negative bribe eﬀect is not aﬀected since the cost of bribing judges or policemen
does not depend on φS. This can easily be seen in (10) since the right hand side
corresponds to the salary eﬀect (which depends on φS)a n dt h el e f th a n ds i d e
to the bribe eﬀect (which does not depends on φS). In fact, diﬀerentiating the
left hand side of (10) with respect to φS yields: C∗ +( φS)∂C∗/∂(φS).T h e
ﬁrst eﬀect C∗ is positive (i.e. for a given level of crime, when φS increase,
each criminal organization increases the level of corruption to induce people
to become criminal) whereas the second one (φS)∂C∗/∂(φS) is negative (i.e.
when φS increase, there is less crime and thus there is less need to corrupt
14judges or policemen so that corruption decreases). As a result, for low values
of φS,c r i m eC∗ is quite high so when φS increases, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
the second eﬀect so that corruption increases. For high values of φS,w h e n
φS increases, the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one because the crime level
C is quite low and it is not optimal for criminal organizations to increase
corruption.
When 2(f +t)(n+1) 2/(n+2) 2 < (B −w0)2 ≤ (f +t)(n+2) 2/8,s a n c t i o n s
aﬀect monotonically both crime and corruption. In this intermediate case,
where the proceeds from crime are higher but not too high and judges are
better paid, higher sanctions lead to more corruption but less crime. See
Figure 1b for an illustration of this case.
Let us now interpret the case when (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8,w e r e
labor productivity is low, the probability to be corrupted high and the pro-
ceeds of crime large. Using the above interpretation, this case would be either
“Southern” Italy or Colombia. Let us use Figure 1c to understand the results.
In this case, when φS increase, it is always optimal for criminal organizations
to increase corruption because the resulting gain in the reduction of criminals’
wages with the fact that the net proceeds from crime B − w0 are high are
always greater than the increasing cost of bribing judges (which is not aﬀected
by φS). In the crime market, this is not always true. Indeed, as stated above,
only the salary eﬀect is aﬀected by φS. Take equation (11). It is easy to
see the sign of ∂C∗/∂(φS) depends on −(1 − 2x∗)+2 φS∂x∗/∂(φS).W h e n
(B −w0)2 > (f +t)(n+2) 2/8,t h eﬁrst eﬀect −(1−2x∗) (i.e. for a given level
of corruption, when φS increase, it becomes more costly to hire criminals)
is negative whereas the second one 2(φS)∂x∗/∂(φS) (i.e. when φS increases,
there is more corruption and it becomes less costly to hire criminals since their
probability to be sentenced if caught is lower) is positive. As a result, for
low values of φS,w h e nφS increases, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one
because the corruption is still quite low so that it becomes more costly to pay
criminals and thus crime is reduced. However, for high values of φS, the sec-
ond eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one since the level corruption is quite high and
thus quite eﬀective so that crime increases.
This is our main result. In a country where crime is proﬁt a b l er e l a t i v et o
legal economic opportunities, judges are badly-paid and easy to corrupt, then
for crimes that involve large sanctions (drug dealing, murders, ...), increasing
15the crime detection probability or the severity of the sanctions results in more
rather than less crime. This is due to the fact that, when sanctions increase,
the optimal response of criminal organizations is to increase corruption to
counteract the rise in sanctions. This implies that, in countries with weak
governance, the policy implications of the standard crime model may not hold
and instead, as our model suggests, deterrence can only be eﬀective ensuing a
substantial cut down in corruption. Basically, the issue is that a rise in φS can
take the model into a set of the parameter space where crime and corruption
are strategic complements, as long a the equilibrium bribe is bounded.
It is interesting to compare our result with that of Malik’s (1990). In
his model, individuals engage in socially costly activities that reduce their
probability of being caught and ﬁned. This is comparable to corruption in our
model. His main ﬁnding is to show that it is not necessarily optimal to set ﬁnes
for oﬀenses as high as possible. This has the same ﬂavor as our result (iii)
in Proposition 3. There are however important diﬀerences between the two
models. First, contrary to us, Malik (1990) adopts a normative perspective.
He focuses on an enforcement agency that aims at reducing the social costs of
avoidance activities by increasing ﬁnes. In our analysis, there is no such an
agency. There is instead competition between criminal organizations. In our
model, we cannot really speak about eﬃciency. Our results are comparative
statics results. If one compares two equilibria with diﬀerent levels of sanctions,
then the one with the highest level of sanctions is not necessarily the one with
the lowest levels of crime and corruption. Second, his main result is driven by
the fact that individuals are heterogeneous ex ante in their earning abilities.
In our model, all agents are identical ex ante and our main result is driven by
the imperfect competition in the crime and corruption markets and the fact
that crime and corruption are strategic complements. The mechanism that
l e a d st ot h er e s u l t si st h u sq u i t ed i ﬀerent in the two models.
[Insert Figures 1a,1ba n d1ch e r e ]
We can analyze further the latter eﬀect by investigating case (iii) in Propo-
sition 3. We have the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 and (14). Then (i)
the lower the labor productivity w0 in the legal sector, (ii) the higher the booty
16B per crime, (iii) the easier it is to bribe law enforcers (i.e. the lower the
reservation bribe f and associated transaction cost t), and/or (iv) the weaker
is the competition between criminal organizations (i.e. the lower is n), the
lower is the threshold of φS above which crime and corruption become strategic
complements, i.e. the more likely that an increase in policing or sanctions leads
to an increase in crime.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
This proposition complements our previous results. It explains why in some
countries deterrence works, even if diluted by corruption, while in others it can
have perverse eﬀects. The proposition establishes that where productivity is
quite low so that legal jobs are not very attractive, bribing is pervasive, and
criminal organizations have high market power, then increasing policing and
sanctions is more likely to trigger strategic complementarity among corruption
and crime resulting in a perverse eﬀect of deterrence.
This result contrasts with the literature that has posited optimal maximal
sanctions. First, Polinski and Shavell (1979) show that if ﬁne collection is
costless and monitoring of criminal activity is costly, the optimal magnitude of
ﬁnes corresponds to the maximum payable by criminals. When this maximum
falls well short of the booty from crime, nonmonetary sanctions are required
for deterrence. Since it is not only costly to apprehend criminals but also
to punish them, Shavell (1987) proves that it is optimal for sanctions to be
imposed with low frequency. Hence, in the case that the courts’ information
is imperfect, deterrence requires suﬃciently large sanctions. The standard
result is that under risk neutrality ﬁnes should be maximal. If the optimal ﬁne
is not maximal, due to risk aversion,6 the presence of corruption in Polinski
and Shavell (2001) dictates higher sanctions to counter the deterrence-diluting
eﬀects of corruption. In contrast, in our model, until bribery can be eradicated,
the rising of sanctions worsens the corruption and crime problems.
6Polinski and Shavell (2000) present the standard case with risk neutrality (p.50) and
then discuss other reasons why maximal ﬁnes may not be optimal (p. 62-64). First, mar-
ginal deterrance may dictate heterogenous ﬁn e sa c r o s sc r i m i n a la c t sh a r m f u li nd i ﬀerent de-
grees. Second, the potential for general enforcement investments yields economies of scope
in monitoring inducing apprehension probabilities consistent with deterrance for sanction
magnitudes below the maximal level.
175 Free entry
One may wonder what happens to the model if we allow for free entry. In our
model, it means that we investigate the formation of criminal organizations,
given that each of them creates their own “local” corruption market. We would
thus like to know the number of criminal organizations that will be created in
a given country.
Each criminal organization that enters the crime/corruption market must
pay a positive ﬁxed cost G. To determine the number of criminal organizations
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In this case, increasing sanctions always increases the crime and corruption







7The superscript e indicates equilibrium variables under free entry.
18Proof. See Appendix 2.
The following comments are in order. First, as in the case with a ﬁxed
number of criminal organizations, condition (17) guarantees that Ce and xe
are strictly positive and unique. Condition (18) guarantees that ne is strictly
positive and that, at the free entry equilibrium, the market is not covered, i.e.
some judges are not corrupted. As it can be seen, in order for a free-entry
market to stay non-covered, it has to be that the free-entry ﬁxed cost G is
bounded above. The intuition is as follows. When the ﬁxed cost G increases,
there are less criminal organizations in the economy so less competition for
crime. This implies that the crime, the corruption level and the proﬁtp e r
criminal organization increases. As a result, for the market not to be covered,
i.e. xe < 1/2,i th a st ob et h a tG is not too high. Similarly, for ne to be
positive, i.e. some criminal organizations want to enter the market, it has to
be that G is not too high. These two conditions are expressed in (18). Second,
when there is free entry, the number of criminal organizations ne,t h ec r i m e
and corruption level per criminal organization, Ce and xe, are respectively
given by (19), (20) and (21). It is easy to verify that both Ce and xe increase
with sanctions φS. Indeed, when sanctions increase, the competition in the
c r i m em a r k e ti sr e d u c e da n dt h u sCe and xe increase. This is does not however
increase the total level of crime neCe and corruption 2nexe in the economy.
We would like now to see if our previous result established in Proposition 3
(iii), i.e. increasing sanctions can increase both crime and corruption, is still
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then, under free entry, increasing sanctions increase the total levels of both







19Proof. See Appendix 2.
This proposition shows that increasing sanctions can increase both the total
levels of crime and corruption in the economy if (23) holds, i.e. the ﬁxed cost
G has to be bounded above and below. Indeed, as in Proposition 5, the ﬁxed
cost cannot be too large for the market not to be covered and for criminal
organizations to enter the market. But, because G positively aﬀects both Ce
and xe,t h eﬁxed cost cannot be too low for this result to hold, otherwise
increasing sanctions would reduce crime. Indeed, if the ﬁxed cost G is very
low and sanctions increase, there are two eﬀects: a low G implies a high ne,
thus more competition in the crime market, but an increase in φS reduces ne.
In this case, each criminal organization raises its level of corruption xe and
hires more criminals but the global eﬀect reduces total crime neCe because
there are less criminal organizations in the economy. If, on the contrary, G is
not too low, the reduction in competition in the crime market is strong enough
to reverse the result.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has spelled out the role of corruption and imperfect competition
in preventing the justice system to work eﬃciently. Indeed, in a model where
criminal organizations compete a la Cournot on the crime market and act
as local monopsonists on the corruption market, we have showed that when
bribing costs are small relative to crime proﬁtability, beyond a threshold further
sanctions lead to higher rather than lower crime.
We agree with Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), Polinski and Shavell (1979)
and Levitt (1997, 1998) that enhancing enforcement eﬃciency and sanction
severity in order to increase expected punishment, thereby reducing crimi-
nal activity, is important. However, when dealing with organized crime that
engages in corruption to manipulate conviction probabilities, complementary
measures, such as crack down on corruption or the institutionalization of checks
and balances, are warranted to control the problem. Our model delivers stark
conclusions with respect to the relationship between crime and corruption and
as to why the standard “crime and punishment” framework may fail for some
countries. Further eﬀorts to inﬂict tougher sentences on criminals will just
raise the rents to organized crime, when corruption is pervasive. More gener-
20ally the enforcement of property rights at large can break down once the police
force and courts stop functioning properly. Beyond a threshold of corruption
in the justice system, increasing returns in various types of crime may take oﬀ.
This observation may explain crime dynamics in some countries (e.g. Colom-
bia and Russia) or regions within countries (e.g. Sicily in Italy). Once this
process starts, the best policy may be to contain diﬀusion of corruption by
organized crime to neighboring jurisdictions. Before it starts, the best policy
may be to try to suppress organized crime rents.
Given the complementarity between crime and corruption, and since build-
ing the required institutions for a transparent legal system can take a long time
to achieve, tolerating some degree of illegality (or of a harmful activity which
is legalized) can be desirable if it helps to destroy the rents of organized crime.
It is interesting to observe that, in the 1920’s, during prohibition in the United
States, organized crime did have police, judges and politicians in its payroll.
In this period of time, more monitoring and investigation of alcohol distribu-
tion only increased the rents of the business for both traﬃckers and corrupt
“enforcers”. On the one hand, in some sense, severe sanctions on alcohol con-
sumption sowed the seeds for a powerful cartel that came to be known as the
mob. On the other hand, the destruction of rents through legalization had a
lasting eﬀect in weakening the inﬂuence of organized crime on the legal system,
which had facilitated all kinds of illegal subsidiary operations by the Maﬁa,
including gambling, prostitution and racketeering.
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23APPENDIX 1: Proofs for the case of a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms
Proof of Proposition 1
First, by assuming that f + t>2(φS)2 (see (14)), we guarantee that: (i)
the second order condition (8) is always true, (ii)( f +t)(n+1)> 2(φS)2.A sa
result, (ii) implies that the denominator of C∗ and x∗ are both strictly positive
and that the equilibrium proﬁt π∗(n) given by (15) and the equilibrium wage
w∗(n) given by (16) are both strictly positive.
Second, using (12) and (13), it is easy to see that C∗ > 0 and x∗ > 0 is
equivalent to B − w0 > φS. This is guaranteed by (14).
Third, because we consider the case of local monopsonists, we have to check
that in equilibrium some judges will not be corrupted (i.e. the market is not
covered). The market is not covered iﬀ x∗ < 1/2. Using (12), this writes:
φS (B − w0 − φS)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 <
1
2
which is equivalent to
φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
This is the third part in the bracket in (14).
Finally, to calculate the equilibrium proﬁt and the equilibrium criminal’s
wage, it suﬃces to plug (12) and (13) in (5) and in (3).
Proof of Proposition 2


























24Proof of Proposition 3
Before proving the result of this proposition, we need the following lem-
mata.
Lemma 1
(i) When (B − w0)
2 < (f + t)/2,
B − w0 <
p
(f + t)/2 <
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
(ii) When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)
2 < (f + t)(n +1 )/2,
p
(f + t)/2 <B− w0 <
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
(iii) When (f + t)(n +1 )/2 < (B − w0)
2 < (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2,
p
(f + t)/2 <
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
<B− w0
(iv) When (B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2,




(f + t)/2 <B− w0
Proof. If one compares
p
(f + t)/2,B−w0 and (f + t)(n +1 )/[2(B − w0)],
one easily obtains:
B − w0 ≷
p
(f + t)/2 ⇔ (B − w0)
2 ≷ (f + t)/2
B − w0 ≷
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
⇔ (B − w0)
2 ≷ (f + t)(n +1 )/2
p
(f + t)/2 ≷
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
⇔ (B − w0)
2 ≷ (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2
Since, (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2 > (f + t)(n +1 )/2 > (f + t)/2, the result follows.
25Lemma 2
(i) When (B − w0)
2 ≤ (f + t)/2, then condition (14) is equivalent to φS<
B − w0.
(ii) When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)
2 ≤ (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2, then condition (14)
is equivalent to φS<
p
(f + t)/2.
(iii)( B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2, then condition (14) is equivalent to
φS<(f + t)(n +1 )/[2(B − w0)].
Proof. By using Lemma 1 and condition (14), this is straightforward.
Lemma 3 (Comparative Statics of C∗) Deﬁne8
(φS)
CSC
1 ≡ B − w0 −
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
(φS)
CSC
2 ≡ B − w0 +
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
(i) When (B − w0)
2 < (f + t)(n +1 )/2 ,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 , ∀φS
(ii) When (B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )/2 ,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
















Proof. By diﬀerentiating (13), we obtain:
∂C∗
∂(φS)
=( f + t)
−2(φS)2 +4 ( φS)(B − w0) − (f + t)(n +1 )
[(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2]
2
In order to study the sign of ∂C∗/∂(φS),w eh a v et os t u d y
Ω
CSC(φS) ≡− 2(φS)
2 +4 ( φS)(B − w0) − (f + t)(n +1 )
8The superscript CSC refers to the comparative statics of C∗.
26The discriminant is given by: ∆CSC =8 [ 2 ( B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) ] .
Two cases arise.
• If (B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 (i.e. ∆CSC < 0), then ΩCSC(φS) < 0 is
always true since the graph of ΩCSC(φS) is situated in the negative orthant.
This implies that ∂C∗/∂(φS) < 0, ∀φS.T h i sp r o v e s(i).
• If (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 (i.e. ∆CSC > 0), then we have to study
ΩCSC(φS).T h et w or o o t sa r eg i v e nb y
(φS)
CSC
1 = B − w0 −
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
(φS)
CSC
2 = B − w0 +
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
Since ΩCSC(φS) is a quadratic function and the coeﬃcient of (φS)2, −2,i s
negative, ΩCSC(φS) is a concave function that intersects the vertical axis twice,
exactly at the two roots. Thus, ΩCSC(φS) is negative if and only if φS<
(φS)CSC
1 or φS>(φS)CSC
2 and ΩCSC(φS) is positive if and only if (φS)CSC
1 <
φS<(φS)CSC
2 .T h i sp r o v e s(ii).
Now, we have to check that the comparative statics of C∗ with respect to
φS holds when condition (14) holds. We have a ﬁrst result.
Lemma 4











(ii) When (f + t)(n +2 )





(f + t)/2 < (φS)
CSC
2










First, let us show that, when (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) /2, (φS)CSC
2 >
p







2 = B − w0 +
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 >B− w0
W eh a v es h o w nt h a ti nl e m m a1t h a tw h e n(B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )/2,
B −w0 >
p
(f + t)/2 and B −w0 >
(f+t)(n+1)
2(B−w0) .S i n c e(φS)CSC
2 >B−w0,t h i s
implies that, when (B − w0)







2(B−w0) . This proves the second inequality of (i), (ii) and
(iii).
Let us prove (i) and (ii). (φS)CSC
1 ≷
p
(f + t)/2 is equivalent to




(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
which, by taking the square of both sides, leads to:
(f + t)n ≷ 4
q
(f + t)(B − w0)2/2 − (f + t)
2 (n +1 ) /4
By taking again the square of both sides, we obtain:
(f + t)(n +2 )
2 ≷ 8(B − w0)
2
which implies that
When (B − w0)
2 ≶ (f + t)(n +2 )





This proves (i) and the left hand side of (ii).






2 − (f + t)(n +1 )< 2(B − w0)
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h i si n e q u a l i t yi sp o s i t i v es i n c ew ea r ei nt h ec a s eo f
(B−w0)2 > (f +t)(n+1)2/2 > (f +t)(n +1 )/2. We can thus take the square
of both sides and obtain:
(B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )/2
This is always true when (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,s i n c e(f + t)(n +




2(B−w0) . This proves the left hand side of (iii).
We are now able to totally characterize the comparative statics of φS on
C∗.
28Lemma 5 (Comparative Statics of C∗ and Condition (14))
(i) When (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)/2,
∂C∗
∂(φS)
< 0 , ∀φS<B− w0
(ii) When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8,
∂C∗
∂(φS)
< 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(iii) When (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 ≤ (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)












(iv) When (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 ,i fφS<(φS)
CSC
1 <




> 0 ,i f(φS)
CSC
1 < φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
Proof.
(i) When (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)/2,w ek n o wf r o mL e m m a2(i) that con-
dition (14) is: φS<B− w0 and from Lemma 3 (i) that, since (f + t)/2 <
(f + t)(n +1 )/2,w eh a v e :
∂C∗
∂(φS)
< 0 , ∀φS
The result follows.
(ii) To show this result, we have to consider two cases:
When (f +t)/2 < (B−w0)2 < (f +t)(n+1)/2 and when (f +t)(n+1)/2 <
(B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8.
Let us start with (f +t)/2 < (B −w0)2 < (f +t)(n+1)/2.W ek n o wf r o m
Lemma 2 (ii) that, since (f +t)(n+1)/2 < (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2, condition (14)
is: φS<
√
f + t and from Lemma 3 (i) that
∂C∗
∂(φS)
< 0 , ∀φS
29The result follows.
Consider now the case when (f+t)(n+1)/2 < (B−w0)2 < (f+t)(n+2)2/8.
We know from Lemma 2 (ii) that, since (f +t)(n+2) 2/8 < (f + t)(n +1 )
2 /2
and (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 > (f + t)/2, condition (14) is: φS<
p
(f + t)/2.F u r -
thermore, from Lemma 4 (i), we know that when (f+t)(n+1)/2 < (B−w0)2 <
(f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8, (φS)CSC
1 >
p




< 0, if φS<
p
(f + t)/2
since φS cannot be greater than
p
(f + t)/2.
Now putting together these two cases, we obtain (ii).
(iii) We know from Lemma 2 (ii) that, since (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 >f+
t, condition (14) is: φS<
p
(f + t)/2.W e k n o w a l s o f r o m L e m m a 4 (ii)
that when (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 < (B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2 , (φS)CSC
1 <
p
(f + t)/2 < (φS)CSC
2 . As a result, using Lemma 3 (ii), the result follows.
(iv) We know from Lemma 2 (iii) that, when (B−w0)2 > (f+t)(n+1)2/2,
condition (14) is: φS<(f +t)(n+1)[2(B − w0)].W ek n o wa l s of r o mL e m m a





2 .N o w ,u s i n gL e m m a3(ii), the result follows.
Let us now study the comparative statics of x∗ with respect to φS.




(f + t)(n +1 )−
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p






(f + t)(n +1 )+
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2
2(B − w0)
(i) When (B − w0)
2 < (f + t)(n +1 )/2 ,
∂x∗
∂ (φS)

















(ii) When (B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )/2 ,
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 , ∀φS




2(φS)2 (B − w0) − 2φS(f + t)(n +1 )+( f + t)(n +1 )( B − w0)
[(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2]
2
In order to study the sign of ∂x∗/∂(φS),w eh a v et os t u d y
Ω
CSX(φS) ≡ 2(φS)
2 (B − w0) − 2φS(f + t)(n +1 )+( f + t)(n +1 )( B − w0)
The discriminant is given by: ∆CSX =4 ( f+t)(n+1)[(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2].
Two cases arise.
• If (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 (i.e. ∆CSX < 0), then ΩCSX(φS) > 0 is
always true since the graph of ΩCSX(φS) is situated in the positive orthant.
This implies that ∂x∗/∂(φS) > 0, ∀φS.T h i sp r o v e s(ii).
• If (B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 (i.e. ∆CSX > 0), then we have to study




(f + t)(n +1 )−
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p





(f + t)(n +1 )+
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2
2(B − w0)
Since ΩCSX(φS) is a quadratic function and the coeﬃcient of (φS)2, 2(B−w0),
is positive, ΩCSX(φS) is a convex function that intersects the vertical axe
twice, at exactly the two roots. Thus, ΩCSX(φS) is positive if and only if
φS<(φS)CSX
1 or φS>(φS)CSX
2 and ΩCSX(φS) is negative if and only if
(φS)CSX
1 < φS<(φS)CSX
2 .T h i sp r o v e s(i).
Lemma 7
(i) When (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)/2,
(φS)
CSX
1 <B− w0 < (φS)
CSX
2






(f + t)/2 < (φS)
CSX
2
(iii) When 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 )











Let us ﬁrst study the conditions on (φS)CSX
2 in (i), (ii) and (iii). (φS)CSX
2 >
B − w0 is equivalent to
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2 > 2(B − w0)
2 − (f + t)(n +1 )
When (B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) /2,t h i si n e q u a l i t yi sa l w a y st r u es i n c e
the left hand side is positive and the right hand side is negative. Thus, when
(B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) /2, (φS)CSX
2 >B− w0.S i n c e w h e n (f + t)/2 <
(B−w0)2 < (f+t)(n+1)/2, B−w0 >
p
(f + t)/2,t h i si m p l i e st h a t(φS)CSX
2 >
p
(f + t)/2.W eh a v et h u ss h o w nt h a t
When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)






When (B − w0)
2 < (f + t)/2 , (φS)
CSX
2 >B− w0
This demonstrates (i), (ii) and (iii) for (φS)CSX
2 .
Let us now prove the results for (φS)CSX
1 . We start with (i) when (B −
w0)2 < (f + t)/2. (φS)CSX
1 <B− w0 is equivalent to
(f + t)(n +1 )−
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2
2(B − w0)
<B− w0




(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2
Since the left hand side of this inequality is positive when (B − w0)2 <




2 − (f + t)(n +1 )
¤
< 3(f + t)
2(n +1 )
2
32Since when (B − w0)2 < (f + t)/2, (B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 )< 0,t h i s
inequality is always true. We have shown that, when (B − w0)2 < (f + t)/2,
(φS)CSX
1 <B− w0.T h i sp r o v e s(i) for (φS)CSX
1 .








(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2+2(B−w0)
p
(f + t)/2
By taking the square of both sides we obtain:
(B − w0)(f + t)n ≷ 2
p
(f + t)3(n +1 ) 2/2 − (B − w0)2(f + t)2(n +1 )
By taking again the square of both sides we obtain:
(B − w0)
2 (n +2 )




2 ≷ 2(f + t)
















This proves (ii) and (iii) for (φS)CSX
1 .
We are now able to completely characterize the comparative statics of x∗
with respect to φS.W eh a v e :
33Lemma 8 (Comparative Statics of x∗ and Condition (14))
(i) When (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)/2,
∂x∗
∂ (φS)





< 0 ,i f(φS)
CSX
1 < φS<B− w0
(ii) When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2,
∂x∗
∂ (φS)












(iii) When 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(iv) When (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 , ∀φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
Proof.
(i) We know from Lemma 2 (i) that, when (B−w0)2 < (f + t)/2,c o n d i t i o n
(14) is: φS<(B − w0). We know also from Lemma 7 (i) that when when
(B−w0)2 < (f + t)/2, (φS)CSX
1 <B−w0 < (φS)CSX
2 .N o w ,s i n c e(f + t)/2 <
(f + t)(n +1 )/2,u s i n gL e m m a6(i), the result follows.
(ii) We know from Lemma 2 (ii) that, since (f + t)/2 < 2(f + t)(n +
1)2/(n +2 ) 2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2, condition (14) is: φS<
p
(f + t)/2.W e





(f + t)/2 < (φS)CSX
2 .N o w , s i n c e 2(f + t)(n +
1)2/(n +2 ) 2 < (f + t)(n +1 )/2, using Lemma 6 (i), the result follows.
(iii) To show this result, we have to consider two cases:
When 2(f +t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2 < (B −w0)2 < (f +t)(n +1 ) /2 and when
(f + t)(n +1 ) /2 < (B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2.
Let us start with 2(f+t)(n+1)2/(n+2)2 < (B−w0)2 < (f+t)(n+1)/2.W e
know from Lemma 2 (ii) that, in this case, condition (14) is: φS<
p
(f + t)/2.
34We also know from Lemma 7 (iii) that when 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 )
2 <
(B − w0)2 < (f + t)(n +1 ) /2, (φS)CSX
1 >
p
(f + t)/2.U s i n g L e m m a 6 (i),
the result follows.
Consider now the case when (f+t)(n+1)/2 < (B−w0)2 < (f+t)(n+1)2/2.
We know from Lemma 2 (ii) that, when (f + t)(n +1 ) /2 < (B − w0)2 <
(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2, condition (14) is: φS<
p
(f + t)/2. Furthermore, from
Lemma 6 (ii), we know that when (B − w0)
2 > (f + t)(n +1 )/2 , ∂x∗
∂(φS) > 0 ,
∀φS. The result follows.
Now putting together these two cases, we obtain (iii).
(iv) We know from Lemma 2 (iii) that, when (B−w0)2 > (f+t)(n+1)2/2,
condition (14) is: φS<(f + t)(n +1 )/[2(B − w0)].N o w , u s i n g L e m m a 6
and observing that (f + t)(n +1 )/2 < (f +t)(n+1) 2/2,t h er e s u lf o l l o w s .
Finally, by observing that
(f + t)/2 < 2(f +t)(n+1 )
2/(n+2 )
2 < (f +t)(n+2 )
2/8 < (f +t)(n +1)
2/2
and putting together Lemma 5 and Lemma 8, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7
(i) When (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 , ∀φS<B− w0
∂x∗
∂ (φS)





< 0 ,i f(φS)
CSX
1 < φS<B− w0
(ii) When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)























> 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(iv) When (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 < (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)














> 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(v) When (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 ,i fφS<(φS)
CSC
1 <




> 0 ,i f(φS)
CSC
1 < φS<




> 0 , ∀φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
It is easy to see that Proposition 7 is the technical counterpart of Proposi-
tion 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Let us start with w0.B yd i ﬀerentiating the threshold
(φS)
CSC
1 ≡ B − w0 −
p






B − w0 p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
> 0





B − w0 p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
< 0













(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
> 0









(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
> 0
37APPENDIX 2: Proofs for the case of free entry
Proof of Proposition 5
To calculate n∗,i ts u ﬃces to solve π∗(n) − G =0 ,w h e r eπ∗(n) is given by
(15). We easily obtain (19).
We have then to study the sign of n∗. Because of (14), 2(φS)2−(f+t) < 0.
Thus, n∗ > 0 if and only if
(B − w0 − φS)
s
(f + t)(f + t − (φS)
2)
G
> (f + t) − 2(φS)
2





f + t − (φS)
2¤ <
B − w0 − φS
f + t − 2(φS)2
which is the ﬁr s tp a r to f( 1 8 ) .
To calculate the equilibrium values of Ce and xe,i ts u ﬃces to plug n∗,
which is given by (19) in (13) and (12) respectively.
We also have to check that, at the free-entry equilibrium, the market is not









which is the second part of (18).
















f + t − (φS)
2¤3 > 0
38Proof of Proposition 6













φS (B − w0 − φS)



























f + t − (φS)
2¤
Second, we would like to see how the total level of crime n∗C∗ and corrup-


















φS [(f + t) − 2(φS)2]
£










Thus the sign of
∂(neCe)
∂(φS) is the same as
4(φS) −
φS [(f + t) − 2(φS)2]
£
















f + t − (φS)
2¤ ≷




f + t − (φS)
2¤









f + t − (φS)
2¤ ≷














f + t − (φS)
2¤ >

























f + t − (φS)
2¤










f + t − (φS)
2¤
[4(φS)2 − (f + t)] + (φS)2(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤
#
Thus the sign of
∂(nexe)
∂(φS) i st h es a m ea st h es i g no f









f + t − (φS)
2¤
[4(φS)2 − (f + t)] + (φS)2(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤














f + t − (φS)
2¤ < min
·
B − w0 − φS




Let us start with condition (18). Denote by
A ≡
B − w0 − φS















f + t − (φS)
2¤ >




3(f + t) − 2(φS)
2¤ ≡ D
which, using (18), implies that










f + t − (φS)
2¤ < min
·
B − w0 − φS




This is (23). We thus need to check that D<min[A,E].W eh a v e :
D<E⇔








⇔ 2 < 3.T h u sD<Eis always true
D<A⇔




3(f + t) − 2(φS)
2¤ <
B − w0 − φS
f + t − 2(φS)2
⇔




3(f + t) − 2(φS)
2 <
1
f + t − 2(φS)2 (B − w0 − φS)
Since
1
3(f + t) − 2(φS)
2 <
1
f + t − 2(φS)2
we need to show that
f + t − (φS)
2
φS
<B− w0 − φS
which is equivalent to
B − w0 >
f + t
φS
This is part of condition (22). Observe that B−w0 > (f + t)/(φS) implies
that B − w0 > φS since f + t>2(φS)
2.
Let us now check if condition (17) holds. Because B − w0 > (f + t)/(φS)
implies that B − w0 > φS, it is easy to see that condition (17) is included in
(22).
41